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THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v- , , .,.. 
JOHN HENRY TAYLOR, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 14148 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant appeals from three convictions of murder in 
the second degree, one conviction of attempted murder in the first 
degree, and one conviction of attempted murder in the second degree, 
entered against him by jury verdicts in the District Court of Salt Lake 
County, Judge Jay E. Banks presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
This was a jury trial in the District Court of Salt Lake 
County, Judge Jay E. Banks presiding, on the 28th, 29th, and 30th days 
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of April and the 1st, 2nd, and 5th days of May, 1975. On the 5th day of 
May, 1975, the jury found the appellant guilty on three counts of murder 
in the second degree, one count of attempted murder in the first degree, 
and one count of attempted murder in the second degree. On the 14th 
day of May, 1975, appellant was sentenced to serve consecutive indeter-
minate terms of five years to life in the Utah State Prison for each con-
viction. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks a reversal by this court because (1) the 
jury instructions failed to set forth all applicable factual situations of 
the crime of manslaughter; (2) because the crime of manslaughter, as 
well as the crimes of murder and attempted murder, requires inten-
tional conduct; (3) that the jury instructions setting forth the essential 
elements of the crime of manslaughter failed to include the necessary 
element of intentional conduct; and (4) because the erroneous instruc-
tions for the crime of manslaughter prejudiced the appellant in his con-
viction of the crimes of murder and attempted murder. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On or about the 29th day of August, 1974, the appellant 
awoke realizing he had rent and other bills to pay (Rc 413). To obtain 
some money, he put two guns in his truck, intending to sell them in 
town (R. 413). Without anything to eat (R. 428), he drove to a bar called 
"The Club1' at Fifth West and Second South in Salt Lake City and began 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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drinking a fifth of whiskey at approximately 12:00 o'clock noon (R. 350, 
351, 366, 414). He remained at The Club until 10:30 p .m. (R. 433) 
during which 10-1/2 hours he consumed approximately two fifths of 
whiskey (R. 350, 351, 366), an unascertainable number of 10 ounce 
glasses of beer (R. 375), and about ten pills including Valium (R. 352), 
Methamphelamine (R. 371), and Secanol (R. 451). Due to the exces-
sive use of alcohol and drugs, the appellant became so intoxicated that 
he was slurring his speech (R. 346, 375), staggering while trying to 
walk (R. 346, 375), and swearing and using other boisterous language 
(R. 345, 377). While sitting at the bar, he even fell off a bar stool 
(R. 337). 
At 10:30 p .m. the appellant and a friend walked down the 
street to another bar called the "Fourth Quarter Lounge" (R. 242). 
After ordering a drink at the Fourth Quarter Lounge, the appellant and 
a Mr. Boiling engaged in a heated argument (R. 191, 211, 216, 228) 
which resulted in Mr. Boiling attacking the appellant and hitting him 
over the head with a bar stool (R. 107, 191). In order to prevent the 
fight from continuing, the bartender ran from behind the bar and 
grabbed the stool from Mr. Boiling (R. 108, 217, 228). Regardless 
of the efforts of the bartender, the appellant and Mr. Boiling were still 
very angry with each other (R. 109, 254). The appellant's friend 
cautioned him to settle down (R. 249). After announcing "I'll see you 
all later," the appellant left the Fourth Quarter Lounge. 
- 3 -
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When the appellant returned to the Fourth Quarter Lounge -
twenty to thirty minutes later, he was very upset, angry, and carrying \ 
a shotgun and a pistol (R* 184, 234, 236). Talking and swearing in an 
excitable voice, he said "I'm back." (R. 144, 237). He then approached, 
shot, and wounded Mr. Boiling who was holding a pool cue stick (R. 144); 
threatened a Mr. Gregg but did not shoot him (Rc 146); shot and killed 
a Mr. Hairston while Hairston was reaching for a walking cane (R. 147); 
threatened a Mary Robertson who was standing frozen behind the bar but 
did not shoot her (R. 149); shot and killed a Mr. Gray when Gray arose 
from a chair (R, 150); shot and wounded the bartender who was reaching 
for something in a drawer (R. 444); and shot and killed a Mr. Holt when 
Holt held a bar stool out in front on himself (R. 151, 200) • 
The appellant then left the Fourth Quarter Lounge, climbed 
into his truck, and drove away at a high rate of acceleration (R0 152, 
263). Arriving home, he drove over the curb, parked his truck on the 
front lawn, tripped over the front steps, and fell unconscious on the 
living room floor (R. 388, 389). The next morning, the appellant called 
the police and told them that he might be the man they were looking for 
(R. 301, 304). He remembered having the guns in his hands while at 
the Fourth Quarter Lounge (R. 299), but did not remember killing any-
one (R. 300, 321), The appellant also testified chat he ordinarily became 
angry when intoxicated, especially when physically attacked (R, 438). 
As a result of thus incident, charges were brought against 
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the appellant and he was tried and convicted of three counts of the 
crime of murder in the second degree, one count of the crime of 
attempted murder in the first degree, and one count of the crime of 
attempted murder in the second degree (R. 597). During trial, the 
appellant requested the court to instruct the jury on all applicable 
factual situations of the crime of manslaughter included in Utah Code 
Ann. § § 76 -5 -205 (1) (a) (b) (c) (1973). The court refused to instruct 
on the factual situations of the crime of manslaughter included in 
§§ 76-5-205(1) (a) (c) (1973) and instructed only on the factual situation 
of the crime of manslaughter included in § 76-5-205 (1) (b) (R. 585, 586, 
588, 589, 590). The appellant further requested that the court instruct 
the jury that intentional conduct was an essential element of the crime 
of manslaughter. The court also refused this request (R. 585, 586, 
588, 589, 590). 
Refusal of the lower court to instruct the jury as requested 
misdirected the jury and prevented it from considering all applicable 
factual situations and essential elements of the crime of manslaughter 
in arriving at their verdict and constituted reversible e r ror . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
REFUSAL OF THE LOWER COURT TO INSTRUCT 
ON UTAH CODE ANN. § § 76 -5 -205 (1) (a) (c) 
CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
The jury instructions in this case concerning the essential 
-5-
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elements of the crime of manslaughter stated: 
Before you can convict the defendant 
of the crime of criminal homicide, 
manslaughter, . . • you must find 
from the evidence, beyond a reason-
able doubt, all the following elements 
of that crime: that on or about the 
29th day of August, 1974, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, the defendant, 
John Henry Taylor, caused the death 
of [deceased] under the influence of 
extreme mental or extreme emotional 
disturbance for which there is a 
reasonable explanation or excuse, 
(Instructions 24, 27, 30.) 
These instructions are correct in stating one type of conduct which 
constitutes the crime of manslaughter, i . e . , when the actor causes the 
death of another while under the influence of extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance • However, the Utah manslaughter statute makes it clear 
that two other types of conduct also constitute the crime of manslaughter. 
Utah Code Amu §§ 76-5-205 (1) (a) (b) (c) (1973) defines manslaughter: 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes man-
slaughter if the actor: 
(a) Recklessly causes the death of 
another; or 
(b) Causes the death of another under 
the influence of extreme mental 
or emotional disturbance for 
which there is a reasonable 
explanation or excuse; 
(c) Causes the death of another under 
circumstances where the actor 
_/;_ 
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reasonably believes the circum-
stances provide a moral or 
legal justification or extenuation 
for his conduct although the con-
duct is not legally justifiable or 
excusable under the existing 
circumstances. 
In other words, there are three possible types of conduct 
wl lich constitute the crime of 1:1 lanslaughter f I he ..lower court ii 1 this 
case allowed the jury to consider only one type of conduct in determining 
whether' die appellant was guiliy of nianslau^lnu , wl lether he: 
(b) Caused the death of another under the 
influence of extreme mental or emo-
tional disturbance for which there 
was a reasonable explanation or 
excuse. (Utah Code Ann. §76-5 -205 
<l)(b)<1973).) 
Therefore, the jury was limited in considering whether the appe llai it 
committed the crime of manslaughter because of either of the other 
two types of conduct which also constitute the crime of manslaughter, 
i e , whetl ler tl le appel ianti • • 
(a) Recklessly caused the death of 
another (Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 
, ( l ) (a) (1973)); o r 
(c) Caused the death of another under 
circumstances where the actor 
reasonably believed the circum-
stances provided a moral or legal 
justification or extenuation for his 
conduct although the conduct was 
not legally justifiable or excusable 
under the circumstances. (Utah 
Code Ann • § 76-5 -205 (l)(c) (1973).) 
- 7 . . 
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From the evidence presented at trial, the jury reasonably 
could have concluded the appellant's conduct was reckless and was 
within Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205(1) (a) (1973). 
The word "recklessly" is defined in § 76-2-103(3) (1973): 
A person engages in conduct: 
(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with 
respect to circumstances sur-
rounding his conduct or the result 
of his conduct when he is aware of 
but consciously disregards a sub-
stantial and unjustifiable risk that 
the circumstances exist or the 
result will occur. The risk must 
be of such a nature and degree that 
its disregard constitutes a gross 
deviation from the standard of care 
that an ordinary person would 
exercise under all the circumstances 
as viewed from the actor's stand-
point, (Emphasis added.) ' 
Therefore, conduct is reckless when the actor is aware of but consciously 
disregards an unjustifiable risk. 
The appellant knew he became angy when drunk, especially 
after being physically attacked (R, 438) . Therefore, the jury reasonably 
could have concluded the appellant was aware of the risk to others he 
would create by becoming extremely intoxicated in public with two loaded 
guns at his disposal and that he consciously disregarded this risk when he 
voluntarily spent 10-1/2 hours drinking whiskey and beer, consuming 
drugs, and using deadly weapons in a crowded bar. Therefore, the jury 
reasonably could have concluded the appellant was aware of but consciously 
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disregarded c it i in ljustifiable risk and recklessly caused the death of 
three others and attempted to cause the death of two others. 
The appellant was aware that he had two guns in his hands 
when lie returned to the Fourth Quarter Lounge after an altercation in 
which he was involved had there taken place (R. 299). With the appel-
lai it being aware of tl le risk created to others by tl le fact that he was 
holding deadly weapons while in a state of intoxication and anger, the 
-'•y reasonably could I lave coi icluded the appellai it consciously dis-
regarded this risk by proceeding to shoot five people in just a matter 
of seconds. 
Therefore, the lower court committed prejudicial and 
reversible error by refusing to instruct the jury on reckless conduct 
as provided for in Utal i Code Am i, § 76-5-205(1 ) (a) (1 973). 
The jury reasonably could have concluded also that the 
appellant's conduct conformed to that comma included within Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-205(1) (c) (1973): 
Causes of death of another under 
circumstances where the actor 
reasonably believes the circum-
. • t --•./• : stances provide a moral or legal . 
justification or extenuation for his 
conduct although the conduct is not 
legally justifiable or excusable 
under the existing circumstances. 
Inc jury reasonably could have concluded the appellant 
reasonably believed his conduct was justified nlthougl I it was not The 
appellant had been drinking whiskey and beer, consuming drugs, and 
- Q -
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
had been hit over the head with a bar stool. He returned with two guns 
for what under such circumstances he could reasonably have believed to 
be self-defense because of threats to his person. 
Victim No, 1, the person who had earlier hit him over the 
head with a bar stool, was holding a pool cue stick when he was shot. 
Victim No. 2 was reaching for a cane when he was shot. Victim No. 3 
was shot when he stood up from a chair on which he was previously 
sitting. Victim No, 4 was shot while he was reaching for something 
from a drawer. Victim No. 5 was shot after he picked up a bar stool. 
Although the appellant's conduct would not have been legally 
justifiable or excusable under the existing circumstances, the jury 
reasonably could have concluded the appellant reasonably believed his 
conduct was justifiable because of his mental capacity under the circum-
stances. 
When reasonable minds could differ as to certain facts, the 
trial court must instruct the jury on all applicable law relating to those 
facts. Reasonable minds could differ as to the facts of this case relative 
to all three subsections of the new manslaughter statute. Therefore, 
the lower court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on all three sub-
sections of the new manslaughter statute. This reversible error pre-
cluded the jury from considering all alternatives upon which it could have 
found the appellant guilty of manslaughter rather than murder. 
In State v. Newton, 105 Utah 561, 144 P.2d 290 (1943), the 
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defendant was convlei. dof involuntary manslaughter upon an nisi met nit 
concerning the "right-of-way" statute with respect to traffic regulation. 
The trial judge lefused lo Include portions of tl le right-of-way statute in 
his instructions to the jury because he felt the portions of the statute 
omitted from the instructions were inapplicable considering the evidence 
presented• At one point this court said: 
If there had been any evidence pro -
duced by defendant or by any of the 
witnesses which might indicate that 
the qualifications as to the right-of-
way were applicable, the appellant 
would have been entitled to an instruc-
tion covering that part of the statute 
which was omitted from the instruction 
in question. 144 P.2d at 292. ~ — — 
(Emphasis added.) 
In State > v. Greer 1, 78 I Jtali 580, 6 P.2d 177 (1931) aiic 1 State 
v. Harris, 1 Utah 2d 182, 264 P.2d 284 (1953), the role of the trial 
ji ldge was defined with .respect to that of the jury, rI his court has saiu. 
The right of an accused to trial by jury, 
• * ••' assured by the provisions of our State 
Constitution, means that all issues of 
fact shall be submitted to"tEem and that 
the Court should neither expressly nor 
by implication indicate his opinion upon 
the facts or as to the weight of the evi-
dence. 264 P.2d at 286. (Emphasis 
added.) 
POINT II 
I N T E N T I 0 N A L C 0 N D U C T I g A N E S S E N T I A L 
ELEMENT OF THE CRIME OF MANSLAUGHTER. 
In Utah prior to 1973, criminal homicide committed under 
-11-
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circumstances not amounting to murder was defined as manslaughter. 
Manslaughter was divided into two types, voluntary and involuntary 
manslaughter. 
Utah Code Ann. § 103-28-5 (1933), 
§76-30-5(1953), "Manslaughter" 
defined: Manslaughter is the unlawful 
killing of a human being without malice* 
It is of two kinds: 
(1) Voluntary, upon a sudden quarrel 
or in the heat of passion; 
(2) Involuntary, in the commission of 
an unlawful act not amounting to a 
felony, or in the commission of a 
lawful act which might produce 
death, in an unlawful manner or 
without due caution and circum-
spection . 
A. Intentional conduct was an essential element 
of voluntary manslaughter under Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-30-5 (1953). 
Prior to 1973, Utah case law concerning voluntary man-
slaughter made intentional conduct an essential element for this c r ime / 
In State v. Cobo, 90 Utah 89, 60 P.2d 952 (1936), this court reversed the 
trial court's finding that an unintentional killing may constitute voluntary 
manslaughter: 
This statutory definition [§ 103-28-5(1) 
(1933)] is but declaratory of the common 
law, to constitute voluntary manslaughter 
the killing must be willful or intentional, 
; or there must exist an intention at least 
to do great bodily harm. The intention 
may be inferred from the use of a deadly 
weapon,, 60 P.2d at 956. (Emphasis added.) 
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In other words, to convict the 
defendant of voluntary manslaughter, 
the offense for which the defendant 
1
 was convicted, the jury were per-
mitted by the charge to do so without 
finding that the killing was either 
willful or intentional, thus mis-
directing the jury with respect to the 
elements of the offense for which the 
accused was convicted. 60 P.2d at 
959, (Emphasis added.) 
The Cobo decision conclusively shows that an essential element of 
voluntary manslaughter was an intentional conduct, 
A similar case to Cobo was State v. Gallegos, 16 Utah 2d 
102, 396 P,2d 414 (1964). There the court held that even though the 
word intentional was not used by the trial court in directing the jury on 
voluntary manslaughter, the element of intent was adequately included 
in the jury instructions for voluntary manslaughter because they did 
include the word voluntary. The court concluded: 
The word Voluntary1 . .
 # clearly 
requires either that the killing or the 
act causing the death be intentional 
and not accidental, even though there 
was no express definition to that 
effect of the word, 'intentionally/ 
396 P.2d at 416. (Emphasis added.) 
It is clear that in Utah prior to 1973, intentional conduct 
was an essential element of voluntary manslaughter, Cobo, Gallegos, 
supra, even though the word "voluntary" could replace intentionally in 
jury instructions due to the similarity of their meanings. Gallegos, 
supra. 
-13-
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If this case had been tried prior to 1973, it is clear from 
Cobo and Gallegos, supra, that the trial court would have been required 
to instruct the jury that the defendant could be found guilty of voluntary 
manslaughter only if he intentionally or voluntarily killed his victim. 
B. Intentional conduct is likewise an 
essential element of manslaughter 
under Utah Code Ann, §§ 76-5-205(1) 
(a)(b)(c)(1973). 
Although the words 'Voluntary manslaughter" are not present 
in the Utah Code today, it is clear that the culpable mental state required 
for the commission of the crime of manslaughter is one of intent. 
Utah Code Ann, § 76-5-205(1)(a) (1973) provides that criminal 
homicide constitutes the crime of manslaughter if the actor recklessly 
causes the death of another. Reckless does not mean negligent because 
§ 76-5-206(1) (2) (1973) provides for the crime of negligent homicide as 
a class A misdemeanor, and § 76-5-205 (1) (a) and (2) provide for a reck-
less homicide under the manslaughter statute as a second degree felony. 
This implies that reckless conduct requires a more culpable mental state 
than does negligent conduct. 
A further indication that reckless means intentional under 
the 1973 Utah Code is the fact that reckless conduct occurs when the 
actor is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable 
risk. Webster's New International Dictionary (2d ed. 1954), p . 567 
defines conscious as: 
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[W]orking with critical awareness 
in accompaniment of creative 
impulse; deliberate; intentional, 
(Emphasis added.) 
An awareness and conscious disregard, according to Webster's, would 
be an intentional act. And Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(1) (1973) pro-
vides: 
A person engages in conduct: 
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or 
willfully with respect to the 
nature of his conduct or to a 
result of his conduct, when it 
is his conscious objective or 
desire to engage in the conduct 
or cause the result. (Emphasis 
added.) 
Perhaps the most definite statement of what culpable mental 
state is meant by a conscious disregard of an unjustifiable risk is found 
in Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Lacy, 78 Kan. 622, 97 P. 1025 
(1908), wherein the cour,. said: 
. . . True the courts and text-writers 
quite generally agree that recklessness 
amounting to an utter disregard of 
consequences will be held to supply the 
place of specific intent. And a reckless 
indifference or disregard of the natural 
or probable consequences of doing or 
omitting to do an act, which is generally 
termed wanton negligence, carries with 
it the same liability as an injury 
inflicted by willfulness. 97 P. at 1028. 
(Emphasis addecFT) 
According to Lacy, a conscious disregard of consequences 
-15-
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will be held to supply the place of specific intent or a willful act. 
The Second Restatement of Torts gives an adequate defini-
tion of reckless disregard of the safety of others. Section 500 states in 
pertinent part: 
The actor's conduct is in reckless 
disregard of the safety of another if he 
does an actor intentionally fails to do 
an act which it is his duty to the other 
to do. • • • (Emphasis added.) 
Being aware of an unjustifiable risk is an element of the definition of 
recklessness. When an actor is aware of an unjustifiable risk, a plain 
duty to act arises* Yet, according to Lacy, supra, and the Second 
Restatement of Torts, when the actor consciously disregards his duty 
to act when he is aware that such a duty exists, his conduct is intentional. 
Therefore, reckless conduct is intentional, and Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
205(1) (a) (1973) restates an essential element of the old voluntary man-
slaughter statute, i . e . , intentional conduct. 
Section 76-5-205 (1) (b) provides that criminal homicide 
constitutes manslaughter if the actor: 
Causes the death of another under the 
influence of extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance for which there is a reason-
able explanation or excuse. 
The appellant maintains that this definition likewise contains the essen-
tial element of intentional conduct, the same element of intent required 
to convict a person of voluntary manslaughter prior to 1973. 
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Traditionally, voluntary manslaughter consisted of an 
intentional homicide committed under extenuating circumstances which 
would mitigate the crime from murder to manslaughter. In Utah, one 
mitigating circumstance was the fact that when the defendant killed his 
victim, he was in a state of passion engendered in him by adequate 
provocation, Cobo, supra; People v. Calton, 5 Utah 451, 16 P. 902, 
rev'd on Other point in 130 U.S. 83 (1888). Hence, the words "heat of 
passion" were employed by Utah and many other states as a term 
denoting the heretofore mentioned mitigating circumstance. 
The framers of the new 1973 manslaughter statute found 
that the words ,fheat of passion" were an inadequate definition of the 
modern concepts of this crime, so they substituted an explanation 
stating rather what is meant by "heat of passion." This explanation is 
currently found in subsection (b) of the new manslaughter statute. The 
Model Penal Code, from which subsection (b) was taken verbatim, 
gives reasons for the change in wording: 
We thus treat on a parity with provo-
cation cases in the classic sense, 
situations where the provocative cir-
cumstance is something other than 
injury inflicted by the deceased on 
the actor but nonetheless is an event 
° calculated to arouse extreme mental 
or emotional disturbance . . . This 
is, we think, to state in fair and 
realistic terms the criteria by which 
men do and should appraise the miti-
gating import of mental or emotional 
distress when it is a factor in so 
-17-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
fjrave a crime as homicide . . . T]he offense is murder if the actor 
kills purposely or knowingly, unless 
there is mental or emotional dis-
turbance deemed to rest on reason-
able explanation or excuse within the 
meaning of paragraph (1) (b) of this 
Section. M.P.C. Tent. Dr. #9, 
p . 41, 45. (Emphasis added.) 
Accordingly, when the actor kills purposely or knowingly in 
a condition of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, the crime is 
manslaughter, not murder. The essential element of intent to kill has 
remained even though the words "heat of passion" have been eliminated 
and other words have been substituted in their place. 
It is evident that Utah legislators accepted these comments 
found in the Model Penal Code as a basis for changing the wording of the 
old voluntary manslaughter statute. 
The causing of the death of another, 
when one is acting under the influence 
of extreme mental or emotional dis -
turbance, for which there is a reason-
able explanation or excuse, will cover 
situations formerly handled under 
voluntary manslaughter in this state. 
J. Barney, Utah Criminal Code Outline 
and Commentary, p . 174(1973). 
(Emphasis added.) 
Therefore, subsection (b) of the new manslaughter statute proscribes 
intentional conduct. 
Subsection (c) of the new manslaughter statute states that 
criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter if the actor: 
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Causes the death of another under 
circumstances where the actor 
reasonably believes the circum-
stances provide a moral or legal 
justification or extenuation for his 
conduct although the conduct is not 
legally justifiable or excusable 
under the existing circumstances. : 
This statement found in Utah's manslaughter statute is another extenu-
ating circumstance, in addition to heat of passion, that has been recog-
nized in many jurisdictions as one whose effect is to reduce the crime 
of murder to that of voluntary manslaughter. A concise statement 
indicating that subsection (c) prohibits only intentional conduct in a 
modern manslaughter statute is found in W. LaFave, A. Scott, Crimi-
nal Law, p . 583 (1972): 
A modern tendency, not yet far 
advanced, is to add other extenuating 
circumstances in the category of 
voluntary manslaughter so as to 
include such intentional homicides 
as those committed in an imperfect 
right of self defense or defense of 
others, or of crime prevention, or 
of the defense of coercion or neces-
sity, in which the killing, although 
not justifiable, is not bad enough to 
be murder. (Emphasis added.) 
One fact situation which fits nicely with the purview of 
subsection (c) is found in the cases of Commonwealth v. Colandro, 
231 Pa. 343, 80 A. 571 (1911); Allison v. State, 74 Ark. 444, 86 S.W. 
409 (1905); and State v. Thomas, 184 N.C. 757, 114 S.E. 843 (1922). 
In each of these cases, the defendant was found guilty of manslaughter, 
-19-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
not murder, when he intentionally killed the deceased believing that it 
was necessary to protect himself but when the circumstances did not 
justify the killing. The facts of the present case are strikingly similar 
to those presented in Colandro, Allison, and Thomas, supra. The 
appellant in the present case was provoked by being hit over the head 
with a bar stool and thereafter he retaliated by shooting the person who 
provoked him along with others who had not. Even though the jury found 
that the appellant was aware of his actions and his conduct was intentional, 
Colandro, Allison, and Thomas, supra, would make his crime man-
slaughter, not murder. Likewise, subsection (c) of the new manslaughter 
statute contemplates that the intentional conduct of appellant in the present 
case constitutes manslaughter, not murder. 
At least one state has included the substance of subsection (c) 
of the new manslaughter statute in its voluntary manslaughter statute 
making it clear that the circumstances explained therein are within the 
• purview of voluntary manslaughter, an intentional homicide, rather than 
a negligent homicide- 111. Ann. Stat. ch. 38 § 9-2 (1969) states in perti-
nent part: 
(b) A person who intentionally or 
knowingly kills an individual 
commits voluntary manslaughter 
if at the time of the killing he 
believes the circumstances to be 
such that, if they existed, would 
justify or exonerate the killing 
under the principles stated in 
Article 7 of this Code [Self-defense] 
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but his belief is unreason-
able. (Emphasis added.) 
In Illinois, the type of conduct found in subsection (c) of the new Utah 
manslaughter statute constitutes the intentional crime of voluntary 
manslaughter. Therefore, the type of conduct found in subsection (c) 
of the new manslaughter statute constitutes an intentional homicide in 
Utah, 
C . Refusal of trial judge to instruct \ 
intentional conduct was an essential j 
element of the crime of manslaughter 
was reversible e r ror . 
Intentional conduct is an essential element for the commis -
sion of the crime of manslaughter under Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-205 
(1) (a) (b) (c) (1973). Prior to 1973, intentional conduct was also an 
essential element of the crime of voluntary manslaughter. Cobo, 
Gallegos, supra. Therefore, when the trial judge refused to instruct 
that intentional conduct was an essential element of manslaughter, this 
constituted a reversible e r ror . Cobo, supra. 
Recent case law in other jurisdictions would also warrant 
a reversal of the appellant's conviction on the ground that the lower 
court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that intent was an essential 
element for a conviction of a conscious wrongdoing. In State v. Cutnose, 
532 P.2d 896, cert , denied, 532 P.2d 888 (N.M. App. 1974), the 
defendant was convicted for aggravated assault contrary to New Mexico 
law. Although not mentioned in the statutes that defined aggravated 
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assault, the mental state required to violate them was that of a conscious 
wrongdoing. The trial court failed to instruct the jury of the intent 
required to warrant a conviction of aggravated assault. In reversing the 
conviction, the court said: 
If the statute sets forth the required 
intent, instructions in the language 
of the statute are sufficient0 State v. 
Gonzales, 86 N.M. 556, 525 P.2d 916 
(ct. App. 1974). However, the lan-
guage of § 40A-3-2(A), supra, was 
insufficient to inform the jury that 
conscious wrongdoing was a required 
element .
 0 . Because the jury was not 
instructed on the required criminal 
intent, the convictions for violations 
of § 40A-3-2(A) and 40A-22-21 (a)(1), 
supra, are reversed. 525 P.2d at 899. 
(Emphasis added.) 
In State v. Clingerman, 213 Kan. 525, 516 P.2d 1022 (1973), 
Instruction No. 11 concerned felonious intent while Instruction No. 4 
explained the essential elements of robbery but omitted the element of 
intent. The Kansas Supreme Court, in reversing the defendant's convic-
tion for robbery, said: 
The elements of intent required for
 : 
various statutory crimes vary accord-
ing to the particular crime. Where 
intent is a required element of the 
crime it must be included in the charge 
and in the instructions of the court 
covering the separate elements of that 
particular crime. 516 P.2d at 1026. 
The lower court's refusal to include intent as an essential 
element of the crime of manslaughter constituted reversible e r ror . 
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POINT III 
REFUSAL OF TRIAL JUDGE TO PROPERLY 
INSTRUCT ON CRIME OF MANSLAUGHTER 
WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN APPELLANT 
WAS CONVICTED OF CRIMES OF MURDER 
AND ATTEMPTED MURDER. 
i This court held, in the cases of Gallegos, supra, and State 
v. Valdez, 30 Utah 2d 54, 513 P02d 424 (1973): 
[l]t is generally held, under ordinary 
factual situatloris that where a jury 
finds the defendant guilty of a greater 
offense, the giving or an erroneous 
instruction of a lesser offense is not 
prejudicial, 513 P.2d 424. (Emphasis 
added.) 
In Valdez, this court relied on 41 CcJ.S. Homicide § 427c(2), p . 297 
as authority for its position. It is essential that the court recognize 
the totality of the general rule just stated because included in 41 C.J.S. 
Homicide § 427c (2), p . 298, the same section of Corpus Juris Secundum 
quoted in Valdez as the authority for this ruling, the general rule con-
tinues: 
However, where the evidence author-
izes and requires the giving of an 
Instruction on manslaughter, the giving 
of an erroneous instruction on that 
offense constitutes prejudicial and 
reversible error on a conviction of 
murder, (Emphasis added.) 
In this case, the evidence required the giving of an instruc-
tion on manslaughter. A manslaughter instruction was indeed given, 
but it was erroneous in that it failed to include all conduct which 
-23-
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constitutes the crime of manslaughter* It further failed in omitting the 
essential element of intentional conduct. Because of erroneous instruc-
tions on the crime of manslaughter, the jury was misdirected in believing 
that it could not find the appellant guilty of the crime of manslaughter if 
it felt that his conduct was intentional or that of the unlawful acts found 
in subsections (a) and (c) of the new manslaughter statute. 
In this case, the giving of erroneous instructions on the 
crime of manslaughter constituted prejudicial and reversible error on 
the appellant's convictions of murder and attempted murder. 
CONCLUSION 
From the evidence presented at trial, reasonable minds 
could have differed whether the appellant had violated subsections (a) 
and (c) of the new manslaughter statute. The lower court's refusal to 
include these subsections in its instructions indicated to the jury that 
the evidence did not warrant a finding that they applied to appellant's 
conduct. Thus, the lower court erroneously decided an issue of fact 
which should have gone to the jury with proper instructions, and in so 
doing the lower court committed reversible er ror . Newton, Green, 
Harris, supra. ;?• 
The instructions concerning manslaughter prejudiced the 
jury into believing that if they found that the appellant's conduct was 
intentional, they could only find him guilty of murder and not man-
slaughter. It is well established in Utah law that manslaughter is an 
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intentional homicide, and any instruction directing the jury to think 
otherwise constitutes a reversible error . Cobo, Gallegos, supra. 
The appellant urges this court to follow the general rule that the giving 
of an erroneous manslaughter instruction constitutes a prejudicial and 
reversible error in the conviction of murder or attempted murder. 
41 C.J.S. Homicide § 427c(2). 
The appellant's convictions should be reversed, and this 
case should be remanded for a new trial with proper instructions. 
DATED this \ cVicfTT~"day of November, 1975. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L . HANSEN AND ASSOCIATES 
250 East Broadway, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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